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Emerging Trends in Air Defense 





Kosovo... A War of 
Weather.. Lessons Learned from 

JTF Noble Anvil 

We may own the night... but poor weather 
creates sanctuaries and operational lulls 

• Precision-guided is no longer "good enough" 

• We experienced greater than 50% cloud cover more 
than 70% of the time... and it wasn't the worst part of 
the year 

• Laser or EO-guided munitions cannot hit what the 
pilots cannot see 

• JDAM expenditure equaled the production rate 

GPS -guidance is a requirement and the way 
ahead... invest accordingly... allies too 


IADS Roll-Back.. Kosovo 

Lessons Learned from JTF Noble 

Anvil 

After 7 8 days of hard campaigning, we effected 
little degradation on a modern IADS system 

• Redundant systems and well-trained operators with 
the discipline to wait for a better opportunity 

• Affected tactical employment of airpower 
throughout the war (altitude restrictions) 

• Required significant ISR and SEAD efforts 
throughout the campaign (stressed LD/HD assets) 

Will we train for this environment... or continue 
to assume we can take IADS down early? 


Serb Building Blocks of Counter- 
Targeting 


Movement 

Use civilian vehicles and sma 
numbers 

Use poor visibility 


Information Warfare 
Atrocities of US attacks 
False deployment of advanced 
systems 

Mention of chemical or bio 





Deception 
False paints 
Decoys 

False transmission 


c. oncean lent 
Use ground features for 
concealment 
Use built-up areas and 
underground 



facilities 


An Asymmetrical Approach 


To accomplish 

* Deny NATO 
information 
dominance 

* Preserve combat 
power 

* Impede targeting of 
fixed sites 

lop targe ting 

methods 


" We knew that NATO had modern techniques capable of detecting 
targets so we simply adapted to the conditions on the ground.” Serb 
Army General Negoiav Nikolic 


Weapons Technology Trends 


Guidance 



• Active 
System 


Attitude Control 



w/ lermina 

Digital Correlation 

• On-bpard Digital Flight 
Computer ^ ^ 



ions: 


Warhead 


Enhanced Blast 
NBC / Fuel Air Explosive 
Improved ICM 
Terminally Guided Homing 
• Subminitions 
Anti-radiation Homing 



Most 

Common 

FROG-7 (RS) 
SCUD Variants 
SCUD-B (RS) 
Al Hussein (IZ 
No-Dong (NK) 
SS-21 (RS) 

State of the 

sl?ll (RS) 
SCUD-B (RS) 


Transporter Erector Launcher 

• Survivability: 

• Low Observable Features 

• NBC protection 

• Lightweight armor 

• Automated Fire Control 
^p^ATCOM Digital Downlink: C3, 

TA, FD 

• Qhnrhor coh.nn timo 


Accuracy & Range: 

Minmr?§mi 100 km 

Maximum 1000 km 

• CEP: 10m at min range 

< 100m at max 
range 


Propulsion 

Solid Fuel 


Multiple 

Stages 



EUROPE 

Country Chem 


Belgium 

France 


□ □ 


Germany 


TBMs & Weapons of Mass 

Destruction 


Nuc TBMs 


Italy 

Netherlands 
UK r 

Former Yugosltnja 
Fmr Warsaw pJjttt! 
(CZ,SL,HU,PL,RO,BU) 


□ 


Lance 
Hades 
Pluton 
Lance 
Scud 
SS-21 
Frog - 7 
Lance 
Lance 

Lance 
Frog - 7 
Scud 
Frog - 7 


FORMER SOVIET UNIOI 

Nuc TBI 


Belarus 




Scud 

Kazakhstc 




SS - 21 

Russia 




Frog - 7 

Ukraine 




all others 








AMERICAS 

Country Chpm Nur 
Argentinl 
Brazil 


TBMs 



Ale 

ME / EE 

SS-300 / 10 


Theater Ballistic 
Missiles 

Confirmed programs: 
Chemical weapon 
program 
Nuclear weapon 


H 

□ 


* 


n 




MIDDLE EAST 


Country 


Nuc TBMs 

Iran 

Iraq 

HZrLlr 

□ n 

Iran 130 
Scud 
Al Abbas 
Al Hussein 
Condor 2 
Scud 



Israel 

□ □ 

Frog - 7 
Lance 

Saudi AraCJ 

Jericho 1 / II 

CSS - 2 

Yemen 


Scud 
SS - 21 
Frog - 7 


CENTRAL ASIA 

Country Chem Nuc 


TBMs 


Afghanistan. 
India LJ 


□ 

Pakistan n n 


Agni 
Prithvi 
Hatf I / II 


Scud 


EAST ASIA 

_Ch£ 


d 


hem Nuc TBMs 


□ □ 


\friiO LH 


Badr 
Condor 2 
Scud 
Frog - 7 
Al Fatah 
SS-21 

Scud 
Frog -7 


Arniston 


& 


Nuc TBMs 




M Family 
CSS - 1/2/4 


>r 


Scud 
Frog - 7 
NHK - 1 


n 


Green I 
Sky He 
Scud 
SS-300 




Weapons Technology Trends: 


Mat ip n 

• GPS /INS 

• Digital data 
transfer 

• Integrated cockpit 

• "Fly by Light" 
controls 


Lethality 

• ATGM - tandem 
warhead 

• Medium caliber gun 

• Auto tracking 

• AAM 


Most 

Comi 


tIAVs 


Helicopters 


ommon 


Fixed Wing — 
DR-3 Drone (RS)SA-342 Gazelle (FRMiGp21/F-7 
MIRACH 100 RPNMI-25 Hind (RS) ^ 23 F logger 


(IT) 


BO-105 (GE) 




-29 Fuicrcrm 


Srfte of the Pchela-1 KA-50 Hokum Miraae F-l (FR) 

(Schmel-l(RS) "Werewolf” (RS)^ 2 H F i ank p r 
Harpy (IS) PAH-2 Tiger (FR, G©^7 7 

^=|-^29 Monqoose — 

(RS) 



Survivability 

• Signature reduction 

• IR plume suppression 

• RCS suppression 

• Warning receivers 


RSTA: 

FURS widespread 
Day/night capable 
EO/MMW sensors 



Weapons Technology Trends: Air 
Defense 


AAA 

Munitions: 

• Course correctable 

• Programmable fuze 

• Improved sights 

• All-weather/Day-night 
capability 

• Dual purpose armament 
on IFVs 


Most 

Comi 


ommon 





T ac *'‘ al . ^ anpad 

SA-2 Guideline ^-8 G ecko ^T pipe 
SA-3 Goa SA-13 Gopher SA . 7 Grai| 

ZbU ZJ -4 ca 14 

Crotale (FR) Gremlin 
HAWK (US)_ SAJ.; - 
SA-15 Gauntlet 
2S6 (RS) 


!t 





or 


Ciulale NG 


inqer 


SAMs: 

• Multiple, simultaneous 
engagement 

capability 

• Range increased 

• LBR guidance 

• Multiple seekers 

• Dual air-TBM 
capability 




Weapons Technology Trends: C4 & 

Tactic fiffilg&Jting: 


FURS widespread 
Day/night capable 
Electronic scan 
Phased Array Radar 
Seismic 
MMW radar 


Communications 
Freq Hopping Radios 

ACV 46 (SF) 

ART 2000 (IR) 

LVP 235 (IN) 

PRC- 710 (IS) 

SEM 173-193 CNR 

Fire 

Control System 

Kapustnik-B (RS) 

Vivary (RS) 

AS 2000 (SF) 

BATES (UK) 


Peep Targeting: 

• Extended range (500- 
1000km) UAV 

• Multi-sensor suites 

• Downlink 

Communications: 

• COMSAT 

• Cellular 
telephones 

• Fiber-optics 

• Spread-spectrum 

• Frequency 
hopping 

• Computerized 

Sat^jUtes-/ Precision 



IMPLICATIONS: Foreign 
communication systems 


• GPS /INS 

• Real time/near real time 
downlink - 

• Photo 

• Remote sensing 

• Data 

deployed rapid sensing, target acquisition, and 
pose a serious threat to U.S. forces ability to function 


UAV 50 to 100KM 
Range 

ASN-104/105 (D-4) (CH) 
Fox ATI (FR) 

AS 2000 (SF) 
Brevel(FR/GE) 

Vulture (SF) 

UAV 100+KM 
Range 

TU-143 Reys (DR-3) (RS) 
Fox AT2 (FR) 

CL-289 (CA) 

Meteor Mirach 100 (IT) 
Meteor Mirach 150 (IT) 
Scout (IS) 

Heron (IS) 

Harpy (IS) 




High Tech Challenge: Space 


• "Ultimate High Ground" 

♦ Recon (I & W / strategic / 
tactcal) 

♦ Remote Sensing 

♦ Navigation 

♦ Meteorological 

♦ Communications 



Booster SRBM/MRBM connection 


Nations / consortia with military-capable space 

Programg oosters Recon Comms Nav Met 


CIS X 

(RS/KH) x 

France / v 

ESA X 

X 

X 


X 

X 

X 

X 

X 


X 

X 

X 

X 

X 


X 

X 

X 

X 


Remot 

e 

Sensin 

9 

X 

X 

X 

X 


Countering space asset' 

ECM (downlinks) 
Differential GPS 
Satellite prediction tools 
/ denial programs 
Camouflage / deception 
ASAT? 


China 

Japan 

India 


X 





DEW 

Lasers 

High Power Microwave 

Radio Frequency 
Weapons 

Particle Beam Weapon 


• Degrades US sensors 
•' Technologies are mature in 

China, Russia/FSU, and Europe 

• "Tunable Systems" very difficult to 


countermeasure 


• Proliferation worldwide 




SKYSHIELD Air Defense System 





Swiss twin 35 mm gun system 
Mission: defend high value fixed/semi fixed sites 
Primary targets 

- tactical fighter aircraft 

- helicopters 
Effective against 

- PGM out to 4Km 

• TLAM 

• ATGM 

• cruise missiles 
Countermeasure resistant 
multispectral sensors 

- radar/I R/TV 
Multisensor fire control 
On International sales 
market 


SKYSHIELD Engaging Cruise Missile 







Directed Energy Weapons (DEW) 


• Uses mirror to achieve automatic 

target acquisition and pointing. 

- Mirror compensates for turbulence 
during laser beam propagation 

• Can kill RSTA sensors and ATGM-type 
munitions 

out to 10 km. 






REQUIREMENTS: 

1. ROUGH ACQUISITION DATA 
ON LAUNCH PLATFORM 

TO PROVIDE POINTING DATA 
FOR PROBE BEAM. 

2. SENSOR KILLING BEAM MUST 
BE WITHIN F IELD-OF- VIEW OF 
PGRfe. 


10 km RANGE 


2S6 



• Defends from low-altitude threats including fixed-wing aircraft, 
helicopters, remotely piloted vehicles, and cruise missiles. 


• Autonomous manner or integrated within an air-defense net 


• Maximum effective ranges of the 2S6's armaments are: 
10 km for the SA-19 missile and 4 km for the 30-mm guns. 



• Eight SA-19 missiles and two double-barreled 30-mm guns combined with 
a sophisticated electronics package on a tracked chassis. 


• Maximum effective altitudes are 3500 meters for the SA-19 missile and 3000 meters for the guns. 


• Integrated sensor suite that consists of; an acquisition radar, a tracking radar, a 1RL138 
identification friend or foe (IFF) interrogator, and an electro-optic (EO) system.. 





PANTZYR-1 



Incorporates a sophisticated multispectral senso 
A dual-channel fire-control system 
Engage two-targets simultaneously and have 
missiles in flight at any time. 

Range limit for 57E6E missile is 18-km 



• Counter-PGM, counter-stealth, and 
advanced electronic-protection 

twin-barreled guns (4k 
range) (the same cannon used on the 
2S6), 


• 1400 rounds of 30-mm ammunition, 
and twelve surface-to-air missiles 
(SAM). 


Provides protection against cruise missiles, precision-guided munitions, urn 
vehicles, fixed-wing aircraft, and helicopters 




Emerging Air Defense Systems 





Artemis-30 ADA System - Greece 


Polish ZU-23-2-ZR - Poland 


Type 87 ADA System - China 

OTOMATIC 76-mm ADA Turret 


Chameleon ADA System -Sweder 


ZA-35 ADA System - SA 


SIDAM-25 ADA System - Italy